The
Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal
995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 17, *
Copyright (c) 1995 The University of Illinois
University of Illinois Law Review
1995
1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 17
BIO: David Laro *
* Judge, United States Tax Court. B.A. 1964, University of Michigan;
J.D. 1967, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1970, New York University
School of Law.
SUMMARY:
... In the lecture reprinted below, Judge Laro provides a brief
historical perspective of the federal income tax system and the United
States Tax Court.... The principal forum in which a taxpayer may
adjudicate a tax controversy with the federal government is the United
States Tax Court in Washington, D.C.
Over ninety-five percent of all tax-related litigation is adjudicated
in this court. ... We must look to the history of our tax law system
and the Tax Court to understand the basis of the perception of a
pro-government bias on the part of the Tax Court. ... The federal
income tax law of 1913 imposed an annual one-percent tax on all persons
with a net income over and above $ 3,000, and on all corporations,
joint stock companies, and insurance companies. The federal income tax
law consisted of sixteen pages; compare that to today's income tax laws
and regulations which Commerce Clearing House prints on over 25,000
pages in eight volumes. ... To the contrary, often the taxpayer who has
a weak case is unable to reach an acceptable settlement in the Appeals
Division and so must either pay the assessed deficiency or proceed to
trial. ...
TEXT:
[*17]
Judge David Laro, a graduate of the University of Illinois
College of Law, currently sits on the United States Tax Court. He
graciously accepted the invitation by Professor John McCord to share
his experience as a tax court judge. In the lecture reprinted below,
Judge Laro provides a brief historical perspective of the federal
income tax system and the United States Tax Court. In addition, he
discusses the constitutional source of the Tax Court and its current
status. Judge Laro ends by dispelling the myth that the Tax Court is a
pro-government tribunal.
I. INTRODUCTION
I am honored to be invited to the rededication of the University of
Illinois law school building, joining a group of distinguished jurists,
academicians, public officials, and, of course, the students at the
University of Illinois College of Law. As always, I am pleased to be at
the school where I received my law degree almost thirty years ago. At
the outset, I must note that my comments are my personal views which
may or may not be harmonious with the views of any of my colleagues on
the United States Tax Court for whom I do not speak. Bearing this in
mind, I am privileged to present a brief perspective of the history of
the federal income tax system and the United States Tax Court, with
attention to the controversial issue of whether the Tax Court is a
progovernment tribunal.
II. JUDICIAL FORUMS
The mention of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally brings
chills to the spines of taxpayers. To many taxpayers, experiencing an
audit by the IRS is equated with undergoing a root canal. Indeed, many
taxpayers probably would prefer the latter to the former.
[*18] All the same, taxpayers who undergo an audit, but who are
unable to resolve with the IRS any tax disputes that may arise from it,
are not without a remedy. These taxpayers may choose to resolve their
tax dispute by suing the federal government in a neutral judicial
forum.
The principal forum in which a taxpayer may adjudicate a tax
controversy with the federal government is the United States Tax Court
in Washington, D.C. Over ninety-five percent of all tax-related
litigation is adjudicated in this court. The Tax Court judged
approximately 360,000 cases in the last decade alone and currently has
cases before the court involving liabilities which aggregate about $ 34
billion. As an alternative to the Tax Court, taxpayers have a choice of
two other forums in which to contest their tax matters. Taxpayers may
choose to adjudicate a tax dispute in either a federal district court
or in the United States Court of Federal Claims. Of these three forums,
the Tax Court is the only forum in which a taxpayer may pursue his or
her federal tax controversy without first paying the amount of tax that
the government alleges is due.
The Tax Court's jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency determined by
the IRS is invoked when: (1) the IRS determines a deficiency; (2) the
IRS mails a notice of deficiency (i.e., a "90-day letter") to the
taxpayer or a notice of liability to a transferee or fiduciary; and (3)
the taxpayer timely files a petition with the Tax Court to redetermine
the deficiency or liability. Once its jurisdiction is invoked, the Tax
Court has exclusive authority to resolve the years that are the subject
of the petition. The ability of a taxpayer to litigate in the Tax Court
without a prior payment of tax is the primary reason many taxpayers
choose to pursue a tax dispute with the IRS in the Tax Court.
Notwithstanding the ease of invoking the Tax Court's jurisdiction, and
the popularity of the Tax Court as the choice of forum, a myth has
arisen over the years that the court is sometimes predisposed in favor
of the government. One can understand that some litigants, dissatisfied
with the result of their cases, may try to attribute their loss to an
inexperienced attorney or a biased judge. However, in a more neutral
environment, some academicians, in pursuit of intellectual and
empirical truth, have joined recently in the claim of bias in favor of
the government at the Tax Court. 1 Thus, claims of judicial bias
deserve attention.
We must look to the history of our tax law system and the Tax Court to
understand the basis of the perception of a pro-government bias on the
part of the Tax Court. Therefore, we will examine the [*19]
origin and relationship of our federal tax system vis-a-vis the United
States Tax Court before proceeding to examine the perception of bias by
the court.
III. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
The history of the federal tax law in some sense reflects the social
and economic development of our nation. All of the New England colonies
had adopted a faculty tax 2 by the 1770s as a levy on the profits of a
person's skill or ability. Rather than being a tax that was levied on
actual gains or profits, however, the faculty tax was a class tax that
was arbitrarily levied on assumed earnings. Our Founding Fathers
believed that the power to tax was quintessential for the proper
governance of our country. Taxation was viewed as a means of designing
the national economy, influencing and shaping morals, and implementing
social reform.
From 1789 until the Civil War, most government revenues were derived
from customs taxes on distilled spirits, carriages, sugar, snuff,
property sold at auction, and other articles. The need to finance the
Civil War then brought about a variety of new taxes, including the
first federal income tax that was enacted as an emergency measure on
August 5, 1861. This income tax was abandoned ten years later, but the
desire for an income tax was not forgotten.
In the years following the Civil War, an income tax was advocated by
the farmers and the working people in the western and southern parts of
the United States. In particular, these groups were dissatisfied with
the tariff policies of the country. These advocates stressed that
tariffs unfairly increased the cost of living for those who were least
able to afford it. In addition, these advocates stated, the tariffs
allowed large corporations to prosper and create monopolies, while
small businesses struggled to survive. Thus, as a result of the
tariffs, a serious disparity of wealth among social classes developed.
The differences in attitude toward the income tax reflected the
disparity of wealth in the country at the time. According to a survey
that was taken circa 1890, one percent of the families in the United
States held fifty-one percent of the national wealth and eighty-eight
percent of the families owned only fourteen percent. 3 Yearly income
figures for the same groups revealed much the same imbalance.
[*20] Eventually, in 1894, Congress levied a two percent
tax on income. Subsequently, however, in one of the most celebrated
legal battles in the United States's history, the United States Supreme
Court struck down the federal income tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. 4 By a five-to-four vote, the Court held the income tax
unconstitutional because the tax was not apportioned according to the
population of the United States as required by the United States
Constitution. 5 Thus, based on the holding in the Pollock case, a
constitutional amendment was necessary to subject the people of the
United States to an income tax.
Fifteen years later, in 1909, President Taft began the process of
amending the United States Constitution; he recommended that Congress
amend the Constitution a sixteenth time to remove the constitutional
barrier to an income tax. Less than one month later, his proposal was
approved by both the Senate and the House. The Senate adopted President
Taft's proposal without a dissenting vote. In the House, the bill was
reported and adopted on the same day. The bill's adoption followed a
four-hour debate, which included a warning by the Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee that the imposition of a federal income tax
would turn the United States into a nation of liars. On February 25,
1913, the Sixteenth Amendment authorizing Congress to "lay and collect
taxes on income from whatever source derived" was proclaimed part of
the Constitution. 6 According to the House Committee Report, the tax
was levied upon incomes according to each taxpayer's ability to pay;
"it would be difficult to devise a tax fairer or cheaper of
collection." 7
The federal income tax law of 1913 imposed an annual one-percent tax on
all persons with a net income over and above $ 3,000, and on all
corporations, joint stock companies, and insurance companies. The
federal income tax law consisted of sixteen pages; compare that to
today's income tax laws and regulations which Commerce Clearing House
prints on over 25,000 pages in eight volumes. The federal income tax
law of 1913 allowed six types of deductions: business expenses,
interest on personal debt, other taxes, uninsured casualty losses, bad
debts, and depreciation of business property. Interestingly enough,
mortgage interest and medical expenses were not deductible.
In 1914, the Department of Treasury introduced Form 1040. The House
Ways and Means Committee stated that completing a Form 1040 would not
be onerous because "those citizens required to do so can well afford to
devote a brief time during some one day in each [*21] year
to the making out of a personal return, willingly and cheerfully." By
1915, some congressmen found that they could not complete their own tax
returns because the instructions were too confusing. Incidentally, the
original instructions for Form 1040 consisted of twenty separate
instructions that took up one page; compare that to the current
instructions to Form 1040 which, in and of themselves, are more than
thirty-seven pages long and include tax tables, rate schedules, and
introductory material. Indeed, the current instructions are so
intricate that they begin with information on how to use the
instructions. The complexity of Form 1040, both in 1915 and today,
results from the complexity of the law itself. As one congressman
stated in 1915 in trying to explain why the tax laws were getting so
complicated: "I write a law. You drill a hole in it. I plug the hole.
You drill a hole in my plug." The remark was widely reported, and a new
tax word "loophole" entered the language.
Throughout the years, the federal income tax system also has affected
our society in numerous ways. As observed by Justice Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner, 8 "no other
branch of the law touches human activities at so many points" as does
the tax law. 9 Many of our famous and notorious citizens can attest to
the far-reaching implications of the tax law. For example, in 1925,
United States Senator James Cousins of Michigan charged that millions
of tax dollars were lost through the favorable treatment of large
corporations by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Several days later,
Senator Cousins was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue that he
owed $11 million in back taxes. In 1931, after years of murdering,
stealing, extorting, smuggling, and bribing with impunity, Chicago
mobster Al Capone was toppled from power for tax evasion. Capone was
sentenced to eleven years in federal prison. In 1933, testimony before
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee revealed that J. Pierpont
Morgan, Jr., the most powerful banker in the world, with liquid assets
totaling $ 52 million, paid no income tax during 1931 and 1932. In
1955, because their mother wanted them to work together, the Block
brothers, Henry and Richard, set up a company in Kansas City, Missouri,
to help people prepare their tax returns. The name of the company was H
& R Block.
The Internal Revenue Code has continually evolved through the country's
major wars and fifteen presidential administrations from President
Wilson to President Clinton. The history of the Internal Revenue Code
has been complex. By 1990, the IRS employed 120,000 employees to
collect $ 1 trillion in taxes. The Internal Revenue Code has changed
because of the pressure of external events, the demands
[*22] of war, the challenges of depression, and the desire to
reshape social policy.
IV. THE TAX COURT
As the federal tax law expanded and became more complicated, the need
to adjudicate tax controversies between the government and its citizens
emerged. In 1924, Congress created the Tax Court's predecessor, the
Board of Tax Appeals. Before the Board was formed, taxpayers were
required to pay a tax deficiency alleged by the IRS in order to contest
the deficiency. A taxpayer's sole judicial recourse in federal tax
disputes with the government was to file a refund suit in the Court of
Claims or in a federal district court. Congress did not create the
Board of Tax Appeals, however, as a court of record. Rather, the Board
was created as an independent agency in the executive branch of the
government. Although the Board was empowered to hold pre-assessment,
judicial-type proceedings of tax determinations with respect to income,
estate, gift, and excess profit taxes, the Board's jurisdiction was
limited.
Congress changed the Board in 1942 and redesignated it as the Tax Court
of the United States. Congress also changed the statutory designation
of the Board "members" to "judges." The Tax Court of the United States,
however, remained an agency of the executive branch.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 dramatically and significantly changed the
nature of the Tax Court. 10 The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed the
classification of the Tax Court from an agency of the executive branch
(as is the IRS) to a specialized legislative court under Article I of
the United States Constitution. 11 This, in turn, made the Tax Court an
independent tribunal that was (and is) separate and distinct from the
IRS. Congress also renamed the Tax Court from the Tax Court of the
United States to the United States Tax Court. In 1974, the Tax Court
solidified its independence from the executive branch (and the IRS) by
moving its physical location from the National Office of the Internal
Revenue Service to its own separate building in Washington, D.C.
The Tax Court's primary function is the redetermination of deficiencies
determined by the IRS with regard to income, estate, gift, and certain
excise taxes. The jurisdiction of the Tax Court has been expanded over
the years to include jurisdiction over: (1) certain declaratory
judgment issues, such as the initial or continuing tax status
[*23] and classification of certain exempt organizations and
foundations, the qualification of certain retirement plans, and the
exempt status of certain governmental obligations; (2) special unified
partnership proceedings; and (3) a variety of other matters involving
interest on deficiencies, levies, and awards of litigation costs. The
Tax Court also has the authority to restrain the IRS from premature
assessment and collection of a tax that was the subject of a timely
petition for redetermination of a deficiency before the court. The Tax
Court, however, generally does not have jurisdiction over refund suits.
Most lawsuits requesting tax refunds must still be filed in either the
United States Court of Federal Claims or in a federal district court.
The Tax Court hears only cases involving federal tax matters. The Tax
Court has nationwide jurisdiction over taxpayers regardless of where
the individual taxpayer resides or where the corporate taxpayer has its
principal office or place of business. The Tax Court also has
nationwide service of process and subpoena powers. The court hears
cases either in Washington, D.C., where it is headquartered, or in
certain other cities that are more convenient to the petitioners in the
tax controversy. The Tax Court currently hears cases in eighty cities
and regularly visits thirty-four cities annually for trials.
An attorney from the Office of District Counsel of the IRS generally
represents the government in a case before the Tax Court. A taxpayer,
on the other hand, may represent himself or herself (that is, the
taxpayer appears pro se) or may be represented by an attorney who is
admitted to practice before the Tax Court. In rare situations, a
taxpayer may choose to be represented by a certified public accountant
or another qualified individual. In such rare cases, however, the
accountant or other individual must have passed the rigorous
examination administered by the court. Notwithstanding whom the
taxpayer chooses to represent him or her, all litigants must conduct
the case in accordance with the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure. Many of these rules are similar to, and in fact were derived
from, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In certain cases, however,
the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure differ from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, the rules of discovery under the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure are more limited than the
rules contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
V. BURDEN OF PROOF
In proceedings before the Tax Court, the taxpayer generally has the
burden of proving that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue erred in
the determination of a deficiency in the taxpayer's federal tax. The
Supreme Court held in the 1933 landmark case of Welch v.
[*24] Helvering, 12 that the taxpayer must prove that the
Commissioner's determination is erroneous. 13 Therefore, the taxpayer
generally bears the burden of proof before the Tax Court. Tax Court
Rule 14 2(a) contains this general rule. Although the taxpayer
generally bears the burden of proof, however, the IRS bears the burden
of proof with respect to alleged fraud, new issues, items that raise or
increase a previously determined deficiency amount, or items with
respect to affirmative defenses pleaded in the answer.
VI. TAX COURT JUDGES
Cases commenced in the Tax Court are normally placed on a trial
calendar for various cities, and a Tax Court judge is assigned to each
city with a calendar of cases. Some groups of cases, such as tax
shelters or pension issues, may be specifically assigned to a certain
judge who has had much exposure to, or who has expertise in, the
particular issues in those cases.
The regular judges of the Tax Court are appointed by the President of
the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Other
judges of the Tax Court, known as Special Trial Judges, are selected by
the Chief Judge. The Special Trial Judges usually hear cases involving
deficiencies of less than $10,000. Both the ninetten regular judges who
currently sit on the Tax Court, as well as the various Special Trial
Judges, ascended to the bench from a variety of backgrounds. All of the
judges have tax expertise acquired from prior private practice,
government service, or a combination of both. For example, some of my
colleagues and I ascended to the bench after many years of private
practice representing both individuals and businesses in tax planning,
as well as tax controversy. Other judges, enriched in tax policy and
often litigation, rose to the bench from esteemed positions in
government. Whatever the backgrounds are of the respective judges,
however, each judge takes an objective and independent view of the
issues to be decided.
VII. BIAS TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT
From time to time, potential litigants and their counsel have viewed
the Tax Court as having a slight bias toward the government. One can
only speculate as to the reasons why some members of the public
perceive the Tax Court in this manner. Although it has been written
that bias on the part of Tax Court judges "may be so insidious as to be
indiscernible to both the judges themselves as well as to the
[*25] public," 14 my experience has taught me that the Tax Court
is not biased toward either the private taxpayer or the government in
the disposition and adjudication of tax controversies.
Various explanations are advanced as to why the Tax Court is perceived
to be pro-government. Two of the more popular reasons are that the
composition of the Tax Court makes it more sympathetic to the IRS's
position, and statistics show that the government generally prevails in
the Tax Court.
VIII. COMPOSITION OF THE TAX COURT
Many commentators and litigants believe that the Tax Court judges are
biased because of their backgrounds and positions. In this regard, some
persons who come before the Tax Court believe that the court is merely
an arm of the IRS. As previously discussed, this is untrue. The United
States Tax Court is an Article I court that is an independent body with
no outside influences exerting pressure on it to be either
pro-government or pro-taxpayer. Of the nineteen regular judges
currently on the court, nine came to the court from the private sector
and two worked in the private sector before accepting government
positions. Thus, the Tax Court is comprised of former government and
private-sector attorneys whose individual backgrounds add to the
diversity of thought at the court.
IX. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Articles have been written purporting to show that some Tax Court
judges are biased toward the government. 15 To support this claim,
statistics are given which show that the government succeeds more often
in the Tax Court than it does in district court and the Court of
Federal Claims. 16 A number of problems arise from looking strictly at
this type of limited statistical analysis. In fact, it is myopic
[*26] to derive any meaningful conclusion of bias based solely on
statistics of the prevailing party in the Tax Court.
As the most convenient forum, the Tax Court attracts a larger number of
litigants, some of whom choose to litigate against the IRS merely to
delay the ultimate collection of their taxes. Some tax protesters
litigate for their own political reasons and seem to have an agenda
quite aside from the narrow issue of correctly determining their tax
liability. The court should and does address these parties evenhandedly
and with due consideration for the merits of their cases. However,
because the government prevails in the vast majority of these
protester-type cases, the statistics of who wins and loses display an
imbalance in favor of the government, and deservedly so.
Moreover, statistics are inappropriate because quantifying decisions is
practically impossible. Most Tax Court cases involve multiple issues,
where as refund suits brought before the district court or the Court of
Federal Claims involve, for the most part, a single issue. The
multiplicity of issues makes it very difficult to determine who is the
winner in a Tax Court case in which split dispositions of issues
regularly occur.
Also, the statistics do not reflect the relative ease of commencing a
lawsuit in the Tax Court as opposed to a district court or the Court of
Federal Claims. As stated earlier, a taxpayer may file a petition in
the Tax Court without paying the tax that the government alleges is
due. In the district court or the Court of Federal Claims, by contrast,
a potential litigant must first pay the alleged deficiency. Given that
a potential litigant must first part with cash before commencing a
lawsuit in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims, the Tax
Court is the least expensive forum in which to commence a tax lawsuit.
The statistics do not reflect the fact that the government chooses to
settle its weakest cases and litigate only its strongest cases. Many
taxpayers who file suit in this court ultimately settle in the Appeals
Division of the IRS. Thus, the cases which proceed to trial are usually
those in which the government feels it has a strong litigating
position. To the contrary, often the taxpayer who has a weak case is
unable to reach an acceptable settlement in the Appeals Division and so
must either pay the assessed deficiency or proceed to trial. The
statistics do not explain that the agents and attorneys who represent
the government are highly educated, experienced, and skilled tax
practitioners who know the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and
the Tax Court Rules. Taxpayers, by contrast, often represent
themselves. Approximately forty-three percent of the filings in the Tax
Court are pro se litigants. Thus, many cases are brought to the Tax
Court without an experienced tax professional who can adequately
evaluate the taxpayer's realistic chances for success. Moreover, most
pro se taxpayers do not adequately know the Tax Court [*27]
Rules or the Federal Rules of Evidence and are thus handicapped in the
courtroom. Although judges feel inclined to be lenient when a pro se
taxpayer is litigating, nevertheless in the interest of fairness and
impartiality, there is a limit to such leniency.
A final argument against pro-government bias is the plain fact that
several of the court's decisions, when appropriate, have allowed
taxpayers to escape taxation even when it may have been more equitable
to tax them. For instance, in the recent case of Shelfer v.
Commissioner, 17 the estate of the decedent/wife failed to include the
value of a trust for which her deceased husband's estate was previously
allowed a deduction as qualified terminal interest property. Property
that meets the statutory definition of "qualified terminal interest
property" is generally excludable from the estate of the first spouse
to die, but is includable in the estate of the surviving spouse at the
time of his or her death. 18 The IRS determined a $ 1.3 million
deficiency in the estate tax of the decedent/wife primarily because her
estate did not include the value of the trust. In the Tax Court, the
estate of the decedent/wife argued that the husband had improperly
treated the trust as qualified terminal interest property, and,
therefore, the value of the trust was includable in her husband's
rather than her estate. The period of limitations had expired with
respect to an assessment of a deficiency in her husband's federal
estate tax liability. Notwithstanding that the value of the trust would
escape taxation, the Tax Court agreed with the wife's estate that it
did not have to include the value of the trust. A similar result for
the taxpayer was reached in the case of Arnes v. Commissioner, 19 in
which the Tax Court held that an amount that otherwise should have been
taxed to one spouse escaped taxation because the wrong spouse was
before the court. These cases demonstrate that where the taxpayer is
able to assert a correct legal position, the court will not hesitate to
find in favor of the taxpayer even though purely equitable
considerations may have produced another result.
Because tax law permeates so many other fields and activities, Tax
Court cases tend to be interesting and diverse. Taxpayers who
underreport their income, overstate their deductions, or who merely
find that they are being pursued wrongly by an aggressive IRS all end
up in front of the Tax Court. Over the years, entertainers, such as
Jack Benny, Sammy Davis, Jr., and Willie Nelson, and athletes, such as
Sugar Ray Robinson, Paul Hornung, and Steve Garvey, all have argued
their respective positions before a judge and have had their [
*28] proverbial day in court. 20 One of the most interesting cases this
judge has decided involved the recent case of two professional
violinists who wanted to depreciate their more than 100-year-old
Francois Tourte violin bows. 21 The taxpayers appeared in court in New
York and testified that they used the particular violin bows in the
course of their performances. At issue was whether the violin bows
could be depreciated under section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code or
whether the instruments were nondepreciable as "works of art" as argued
by the IRS. With the court's permission, the musicians demonstrated to
the court the superior sounds which emanate from the aged instruments.
In a fully reviewed Tax Court opinion, the court held for the
taxpayers. That day musicians around the country celebrated their
common victory over the IRS.22
It is a tribute to our system of justice when two musicians can
successfully battle the United States government and prevail on the
basis of sound reasoning and legal argument.
Tax Court cases simply are not decided on the basis of bias or
sympathy, although judges, like others, can empathize with those
taxpayers who appear before the court. Rather, cases are decided after
much deliberation on the basis of strict interpretation of complex tax
statutes. Admittedly, it is refreshing, however, to decide a case on
the law which coincidentally also provides a warm feeling with respect
to the result.
X. CONCLUSION
Our income tax laws have grown complex and are difficult to understand.
Yet, at the same time, the nation's fiscal soundness depends upon
voluntary compliance for the payment of its citizens' tax liabilities.
It is essential that the country have confidence in a court which not
only understands the tax law but can fairly adjudicate tax
controversies which arise between the public and the government. It is
the role of judges to decide cases, without bias, objectively on the
record before them. Taxpayers who choose to contest the federal
government in the United States Tax Court undertake their litigation
with natural concern for cost and result. However, they need not have
any anxiety with respect to claims of alleged pro-government bias. It
is true that the power to tax is the power to destroy, as Chief Justice
Marshall so [*29] eloquently stated in McCulloch v. Maryland. 23
However, it is also unquestionably true that this judge of the United
States Tax Court respects and adheres to the words of Justice Holmes
who wrote that "the power to tax is not the power to destroy while this
Court sits." 24
FOOTNOTES:
n1 See, e.g., Babette B. Barton, Legal and Tax Incidents of Compulsive
Behavior: Lessons from Zarin, 45 TAX LAW. 749, 750-51 n.10 (1992); B.
Anthony Billings et al., Are U.S. Tax Court Decisions Subject to the
Bias of the Judge?, 55 TAX NOTES 1259 (1992).
n2 A somewhat archaic term for a familiar concept: a tax based on the
theory that "every individual should contribute to the support of the
public burdens according to his ability" to pay. See WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1981) (emphasis added) (defining
the term "faculty theory").
n3 See ROBERT HUNTER, POVERTY 345 app. (Peter d'A. Jones ed., Harper
& Row 1965) (1905).
n4 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
n5 Id.
n6 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
n7 H.R. REP. NO. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., at xxxvii (1913).
n8 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
n9 Id. at 494-95.
n10 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
n11 26 U.S.C. A7 7441 (1988).
n12 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
n13 Id.
n14 See Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal
Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied
Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 999 (1991).
n15 See sources cited supra note 1.
n16 The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Annual
Report) is often cited for the proposition that the Tax Court is
pro-government. These annual reports show that the government won or
partially won an average of 70.5% of district court cases between the
years 1965 and 1986. Over the same period, the government won or
partially won an average of 90.4% of Tax Court cases. See Geier, supra
note 14, at 998. Ms. Geier used these statistics to conclude that there
was "a decided pro-government trend in recent years" by the Tax Court.
This conclusion does not take into consideration data in the Annual
Report which shows that taxpayers' overall savings as a percentage of
the amounts at issue in the Tax Court were approximately one-half
higher than in the district court and the Court of Federal Claims. See
Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 579 (1994).
n17 103 T.C. 10 (1994).
n18 Id. at 14.
n19 102 T.C. 522 (1994).
n20 Garvey v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 355 (1993); Davis v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 650 (1989); Willie Nelson Music Co. v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 914 (1985); Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428
(1967); Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20 (1965); Benny v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 197 (1955).
n21 Simon v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 247 (1994).
n22 See William Grimes, Violinists Win I.R.S. Challenge, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1994, at C1, C12.
n23 17 U.S. 316, 430 (1819).
n24 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).