by
George
F. Smith
Thanks to Sen. Robert Byrd
of West
Virginia, government now compels the teaching of the Constitution every
year on
the anniversary of its signing – September 17 – for schools that
receive
federal funds. If you’re wondering where the Constitution
authorizes such
a mandate, you might want to visit a school that day. Perhaps
you’d hear
a “compassionate” interpretation of the General Welfare clause, the
knothole
that has become a black hole. I’m sure someone would remind you
that the
Constitution is a “living, breathing” document, an expression of our
collective
conscience, and to really understand its meaning we should all spend
time doing
community service. [1]
I doubt you will hear that a government powerful enough to exact nearly
half
our income in taxes, where Congress passes laws without reading them or
attaches them to other bills that are sure to pass – as Byrd did with
his
mandate – renders constitutional discussions farcical. [2]
But Byrd may have jeopardized leviathan’s cause if his mandate calls
attention
to Shays’ Rebellion, the event that sparked the Constitutional
Convention. Leonard L. Richards, a history professor at
UMass–Amherst,
has written a groundbreaking book about the uprising that portrays the
Shaysites as Regulators in the spirit of the Revolution fighting a
plundering
state. [3]
Shays’ Rebellion is usually described as a revolt of poor, backcountry
farmers
in western Massachusetts during the fall and winter of 1786 –
1787.
During the Revolutionary War, the individual states and Congress had
issued
fiduciary notes to finance U.S. military operations.
Fiduciary
notes were paper money the government promised to redeem in coin at
some point
in the future. When the future arrived in the 1780s, the holders
of these
notes demanded redemption, and the states, including Massachusetts,
were
raising taxes to pay them off.
As the story is told, many farmers were too poor to pay their taxes, so
the
courts were sending them to jail and seizing their farms. The
farmers
were also in debt to merchants who had sold them goods on credit.
With
the closing of the British West Indies to American trade, the
merchants, under
pressure from their creditors, were now demanding payment. To
avoid
paying their debts, the story continues, Daniel Shays and a few other
“wretched
officers” from the Revolution led backcountry rabble to shut down the
courts.
Massachusetts Governor James Bowdoin called out the militia to put a
stop to
the uprising. When they failed to get the job done, he turned to
wealthy
Bostonians to fund a temporary army. Led by General Benjamin
Lincoln, the
army stopped the insurgents from seizing the federal arsenal at
Springfield in
late January 1787, then crushed the rebellion permanently a week later
in a
surprise attack at Petersham. Though the top rebel leaders fled to
other
states, most of the others eventually returned to their farms.
Bowdoin agreed
to pardon the rebels if they signed an oath of allegiance to the state,
which
the vast majority did.
Although the insurgency ended in the rout at Petersham, “Shays’s
Rebellion” has
lasted to this day as a propaganda tool for state power.
Recruiting Washington
Government-friendly versions of the insurgency spread throughout the
states and
upset many elites, including George Washington, who was enjoying a
peaceful
retirement at Mount Vernon. David Humphreys, one of Washington’s
former
aides living in New Haven, told him the uprising was due to a
“licentious
spirit among the people,” whom he characterized as “levelers”
determined “to
annihilate all debts public and private.” [4] According to Washington’s
trusted
friend and former artillery commander General Henry Knox, who was
planning to
build a four-story summer home on one of his Maine properties, the
insurgents
wanted to seize the property of the rich and redistribute it to the
poor and
desperate.
In a letter of October 23, 1786, Knox told Washington the rebels “see
the
weakness of government” and thus feel free to pay little if any
taxes.
According to Knox, the rebels believed that since the joint exertions
of all
protected the property of the United States from Great Britain, it
rightfully
belongs to all. The rebels, Knox explained, believe that anyone
who
“attempts opposition to this creed is an enemy to equity and justice,
and ought
to be swept [from] the face of the earth.” [5]
Such comments didn’t surprise Washington. He had been buying land
in the
Virginia backcountry for over 40 years and owned some 60,000
acres. The
people who migrated to that area often ignored his property markings,
helping
themselves to his timber and settling down. This was a common problem
of large
landowners throughout the backcountry of every state. In
Washington’s
judgment, these folk were “a wretched lot, not to be trusted, and
certainly not
to be the bone and sinew of a great nation.” [6]
On November 8, 1786, James Madison wrote to Washington saying he and
other
officials had taken the liberty of nominating him to lead the Virginia
delegation at a May convention in Philadelphia. The
upcoming
convention, as Alexander Hamilton had stated, would discuss how “to
render the
constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of
the
Union.” [7]
But Washington had misgivings. A convention held two months
earlier at
Annapolis had failed when only five states sent representatives,
Virginia not
among them. Would the one in Philadelphia bomb and leave his
reputation
tarnished? Besides, he had cited health problems (rheumatism) as
a reason
for not attending a triennial meeting of the Society of the Cincinnati
in
Philadelphia, to be held at the same time as the convention. How
would it
look if he now accepted Madison’s offer? [8]
On March 19, 1787 Knox wrote Washington hinting that (1) he would be
given the
president’s chair at the upcoming convention, and (2) he would not be
presiding
over some middling conference of officials tinkering with the “present
defective confederation,” but instead would lead a prestigious body of
men as
they created an “energetic and judicious system,” one which would
“doubly”
entitle him to be called The Father of His Country. [9]
While Washington absorbed those prospects, he thought about the British
prediction that American-run government would soon collapse. It was
especially
disheartening to see it falter in Massachusetts, the state with the
most
“balanced” constitution, where the influence of the unwashed was
supposedly
kept in check. Washington, Madison and other elites suspected
their
“transatlantic foe” was working secretly with Daniel Shays to help
fulfill
their prophecy. And if left unchallenged, the upheaval would
spread to
other states, where “combustibles” like Shays were waiting to explode
and wreak
anarchy. As Washington told Lafayette later, he could not resist the
call to
help establish “a government of respectability under which life,
liberty, and
property” were secure. [10]
Shays’s Rebellion, then, went from a problem to an opportunity.
It was
used by certain elites to pry Washington from retirement and send him
to
Philadelphia, where his status as America’s foremost icon bestowed a
noble
splendor on their power grab. Staunch opponents forced them to
compromise,
and the document they created would soon be graced with a set of
amendments
that initially limited their power. Nevertheless, the new constitution
was a
big step forward for conservatives, who now had a government strong
enough to
protect them from troublemakers like Daniel Shays and his gang.
The bad
guys lost, the good guys won, so we have been told.
A Closer Look at the Rebels
Richards decided to write a book on Shays’ Rebellion when he discovered
by
accident that the Massachusetts archives had microfilmed the signatures
of the
4,000 men who signed the state’s oath of allegiance in 1787.
Since many
of the insurgents also included their occupations and hometowns, he was
able to
gather more information about them with the help of town archivists and
historians.
Richards makes some strong points about why the standard story of
Shays’
Rebellion as an uprising of debtor farmers does not wash.
1. The western counties of Massachusetts as a whole did not rebel
against
the state, nor did the vast majority of poor farmers. Of the 187
towns
that comprised the five counties in which the courts were shut down, a
mere 45
towns provided almost 80 percent of the rebels. Seventy-two of the 187
towns
did not produce a single rebel, while 34 others produced only 1-4
rebels.
The most rebellious county by far was Hampshire County, producing
nearly half
the insurgents. Here, too, turnout was uneven, with eight towns
not
yielding any rebels, while five others produced over 100. Colrain was
the
banner town of Hampshire County, with two-thirds of the town’s 234
adult males
bearing arms against the state. Yet two small farming communities
close
to Colrain, Heath and Rowe, produced not a single rebel. [11]
2. The rebels were repeatedly described in the newspapers as
“destitute
farmers” or “debt-ridden farmers.” Although the number of debt
suits in
the 1780s skyrocketed, Richards found that “there is no correlation –
none
whatsoever – between debt and rebel towns.” [12]
Only two of the most rebellious towns ranked among the top 10 towns in
suits
for debt, but three of the least rebellious towns were also
among the
top 10.
Colrain, the most rebellious town, had 12 families involved in debt
suits
during 1785 and 1786. Yet only four of these families provided
men to the
town’s total of 156 rebels. Their leader, James White, who led
the
assault against the Springfield arsenal, was convicted of high
treason.
He was also one of Colrain’s creditors. By contrast, the
non-rebellious town of Granville had an unusually high number of debt
cases
during 1785 and 1786.
At the time of the rebellion, Daniel Shays owed money to at least 10
men.
But of those 10, three were rebel leaders. For every rebel who
went to
court as a debtor, another went as a creditor. [13]
3. Shutting down the courts in Massachusetts had been a form of
protest
at least since 1774. That summer in the western town of Great
Barrington,
1,500 men shut down the Berkshire County Court in response to British
oppression. Patriot leaders applauded it.
In 1782, the Reverend Samuel Ely, a Yale graduate, raised a mob against
the
court in Northampton to protest the new Massachusetts constitution,
which he
claimed made a mockery of the Revolution – a constitution,
incidentally, that
John Adams drafted with help from James Bowdoin and former radical
Samuel
Adams. Two-thirds of western Massachusetts agreed with Ely,
concluding
that the “great men” now in power were costing them more than the
lackeys under
George III. [14]
4. Private indebtedness was common with backcountry folk in all
states,
not just Massachusetts. Ordinarily, it was not a problem.
As
Richards points out, these debts were often circular, as one neighbor
might owe
labor to another, who in turn might owe cordwood to a third, who in
turn might
be indebted to the wife of the first neighbor for her services as a
midwife. Debts were expected to be paid, but without going to
court. [15]
Massachusetts wasn’t the only state to experience a surge in debt
suits.
In 1786 creditors in Connecticut took over 20 percent of the state’s
taxpayers
to court. Yet there was no comparable revolt in Connecticut.
The Massachusetts War Debt
It wasn’t debt that triggered Shays’s Rebellion, Richards argues, but
the new
state government and “its attempt to enrich the few at the expense of
the
many.” [16]
The most glaring instance of this abuse was the decision of
Massachusetts to
consolidate its war notes at face value. Even when issued, the
notes
traded at about one-fourth par and later declined to about one-fortieth
face
value.
Many soldiers were paid in these notes and out of desperation sold them
at
about one-tenth their value. Boston speculators swooped up eighty
percent
of these notes, and forty percent of them were owned by just 35
men.
Every one of those 35 men had either served in the state house during
the 1780s
or had a close relative who did. [17]
Legislators praised the speculators as “worthy patriots” who had come
to the
state’s aid in its time of need. But these men did not buy the
notes directly
from the government; they bought them from farmers and soldiers at
greatly
depreciated prices, who were now being taxed to redeem them at full
value. The speculators, most of whom had stayed home during the
war,
would now benefit at the expense of veterans.
James Bowdoin had run for governor in 1785 in place of the state’s
perennial
governor, John Hancock, who had declined to run for reelection because
of gout.
Bowdoin held some £3,290 in state notes, and his supporters were
conservative
merchants and fellow speculators. The election was bitter and close and
eventually decided in the legislature. In his inaugural address,
Bowdoin
pledged to honor the state’s debts in full with new taxes.
Initially, the legislature tried to collect the taxes with impost and
excise
duties, but then added a poll tax and property tax. The poll tax
taxed
every family for each male 16 years or older. Poll and property
taxes
were going to pay 90 percent of all taxes, while impost and excise
duties would
account for the other 10 percent. Thus, a regressive tax ensured
a wealth
transfer from farm families with grown sons to the pockets of Boston
speculators.
As Richards observes, “Taxes levied by the state were now much more
oppressive
– indeed, many times more oppressive – than those that had been levied
by the
British on the eve of the American Revolution.” [18]
Petitions Ignored
From 1782 - 1786, small communities throughout western Massachusetts
had
pleaded with the legislature to address their concerns. Their
petitions
had always been polite and deferential, but their meaning was clear:
the rural
economy was in bad shape, and the new government was just making it
worse.
In the summer of 1786, the legislature once again ignored their
petition and
adjourned. Newspapers in some towns counseled patience, but in
other
towns, such as Pelham, the people had had it. In mid-July Pelham
town
fathers met and began coordinating with nearby communities to hold a
countywide
convention. They decided to find “some method” of changing the
state
constitution and thus getting a more responsive government.
They met on August 22 and set forth 17 grievances, six of which
necessitated a
new constitution. They also agreed to break up the court the
following
week in Northampton as their method of getting the legislature to
reconvene. [19]
Thus, Shays’ Rebellion began as peaceful petitioning and escalated into
violence only after the state repeatedly ignored the petitions.
Shays’ Regulators
Ten years earlier, the Continental Congress endorsed the declaration
that
governments are instituted among men to secure their inalienable
rights, and
that whenever any government became destructive of those ends, it is
the right
and duty of the people “to throw off such Government, and to provide
new Guards
for their future security.”
It was in this light that the rebels saw themselves, Roberts explains.
Their
enemies called them dissident debtors, Shaysites, insurgents,
malcontents, and
rebels, but from the very beginning they understood themselves to be
Regulators
whose purpose was “the suppressing of tyrannical government in the
Massachusetts State.” [20]
“Regulator” in this sense had an honorable history dating back to
England in
1680 and had been used in the Carolina uprisings of the late
1760s. As a
Regulation role model, however, the Shays Regulators drew upon the
success
story of Vermont in the 1770s. In a dispute with New York land
speculators, Bennington farmers had stopped courts from sitting and
terrorized
surveyors sent on behalf of the speculators. Later, Ethan Allen
and his
Green Mountain Boys established the independent republic of
Vermont. Not
surprisingly, the Massachusetts gentry saw the Vermont leaders as
outlaws,
while Allen denounced “’those who held the reins of government in
Massachusetts
[as] a pack of Damned Rascals.’” [21]
The Constitution of 1780
The Shays’ Regulators were outraged over the state’s new constitution
and the
manner in which it had been ratified. A meager and partisan
convention
had approved it without their consent.
In the fall of 1779, 247 towns sent delegates to Boston for a
constitutional
convention. John Adams drafted a constitution, then left for
France on a
diplomatic mission. Another convention was scheduled later that
winter to
approve, disapprove, or modify Adams’ creation. Because of the
severity
of the winter, only 47 towns were represented, most within 10 – 15
miles of
Boston. Their decisions on the document became the Constitution
of 1780.
In general, it enhanced the power of the rich and well born. Though it
included
a bill of rights, white male taxpayers had to be worth at least
£60 to vote,
which was £20 more than their colonial charter under the
king. It allowed
the house to conduct business when only 60 members were present,
favoring those
most able to attend during the winter, the mercantile elite in
Boston. It
also established an independent judiciary and a senate, neither of
which were
answerable to the people, as well as a clause forbidding any amendments
to the
constitution for at least 15 years. [22]
Defenders of the Rebellion
Not all state leaders opposed the Rebellion. Moses Harvey, a
legislator
from the small town of Montague, had been a hero in the war and was now
a
captain in the local militia. He encouraged his men to join the
rebellion, calling his colleagues in the legislature a band of
“thieves,
knaves, robbers, and highwaymen.” [23]
William Whiting, Chief Justice of Berkshire County, had been a
dependable
conservative who had received a number of prestigious appointments and
was a
scion of a wealthy family. Writing under the pen name “Gracchus,”
in
honor of the Gracchus brothers from the days of the Roman republic,
Whiting
published a letter accusing the leadership of enriching themselves at
the expense
of ordinary farmers. He also faulted citizens for their “inattention to
public
affairs for several years past.” “The people at large,” he said,
had an
“indispensable duty to watch and guard their liberties, and to crush
the very
first appearances of encroachments upon it.”
On October 20, 1786, the Continental Congress authorized the addition
of 1,340
men to its 700-man army because the Massachusetts militia was unable to
suppress the rebellion. Congress decided it would be foolish to
tell the
public the real reason for raising additional troops, so they announced
an
Indian war was pending in the Ohio Valley.
It gave Boston legislators a good laugh, especially those from western
towns. But the sharpest critic was Baron von Steuben, the
Prussian
drillmaster who had trained Washington’s troops. Writing under a false
name,
the baron pointed out that Massachusetts had 92,000 militiamen on its
rolls.
Theoretically, the militia system excluded the poor and
transient.
Members were men of substance with deep roots in the community.
They were
men of property. With such a force at its disposal, why would the
Massachusetts government need outside support?
There was only one plausible reason, von Steuben concluded: the
numerous
militias supported the rebels, whereas the present system of
administration had
the support of only “a very small number of respected gentlemen.” If
that was
the case, how dare Congress support such an “abominable oligarchy.” [24]
The recruitment effort failed, leading Bowdoin to hire an army without
legislative authority.
A Major Revisionist Work
I believe readers will find Richards’s Shays’s Rebellion stands
with
DiLorenzo’s The Real Lincoln and Kolko’s The Triumph of
Conservatism
as a work of outstanding scholarship exposing the conservative stake in
bigger
government. Strict constitutional government has a refreshing
appeal in
today’s world because of the Beltway monster we have in its place, but
we
should bear in mind the lessons of Richards’s research. The
constitutional movement included the familiar ingredients of plunder,
crisis,
and lies to further government growth. The original Constitution
was a
step forward for big government.
References
1 “Constitution
Day ushers in mandate to teach the Constitution,” Donna Krache, CNN
2 “Learn,
Dammit,”
Dennis Myers
3 Richards, Leonard L., Shays’s Rebellion: The
American Revolution’s
Final Battle, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2002
4 Richards, p. 2
5 Richards, p. 130
6 Richards, p. 130
7 Richards, p. 127
8 Cunliffe, Marcus, George Washington: Man and Monument, The
New
American Library, New York, NY, 1958, p. 124
9 Rosenfeld, Richard N., American Aurora: A Democratic-Republican
Returns,
St. Martin’s Griffin, New York NY, 1998, p. 468
10 Richards, p. 132
11 Richards, p. 55-56
12 Richards, p. 60
13 Richards, p. 54
14 Richards, p. 59-60
15 Richards, p. 61
16 Richards, p. 63
17 Richards, p. 78
18 Richards, p. 88
19 Richards, p. 6-8
20 Richards, p. 63
21 Richards, p. 64-68
22 Richards, p. 72
23 Richards, p. 14
24 Richards, p. 16.
